Place enforcement in an agent tool wrapper

A tool wrapper can normalize and deny calls before invoking a downstream API, but it protects only calls that pass through it.

01 / The operating case

What changes in a real workflow?

An agent calls a wrapped customer-delete tool while another plugin exposes the raw customer API.

Trace the authority boundary
  1. 01Authority origin
  2. 02Task and grant
  3. 03Current decision
  4. 04Observed outcome

02 / Decision contract

What the executor must check

Check principal, task, tool, canonical arguments and policy before invoking; remove direct credentials or enforce again downstream.

InputPrincipal · task · action · target
DecisionGrant ancestry · policy · current state
ResultEnforce · record · verify outcome

03 / Failure and evidence

What goes wrong, and what can be proven?

Failure mode

The wrapper logs a DENY, yet the alternate plugin deletes the customer.

Evidence to retain

Compare wrapper decisions with customer API operations and alert on unmatched writes.

04 / Canonical scope

Why this reference stands alone

API gateway enforcement sees network calls; this page owns the agent-side wrapper and bypass test.

Illustrative implementation artifact

Wrapper call path

toolCall -> normalize operation and arguments
 -> resolve authenticated task -> evaluate exact action
 -> reject unless ALLOW bound to request digest
 -> call downstream API -> record attempt

Primary references

Read the underlying material

Architecture discussion

Choose one consequential action and make its boundary explicit.

Request a Conversation