01 / Principal and identity
Who acts, and what can the platform identify?
An MCP client agent calls a server that may use its own downstream identity.
The gateway can validate client token and tool call; the executor knows final target and API result.
- 01Originating task
- 02Agent or workload
- 03A tool changes a customer record.
- 04Observed effect
02 / Action-time control
Where can an unauthorized effect be stopped?
Validate resource/audience and coarse scope at gateway; enforce exact action at the downstream executor.
Bind client, task, tool name, normalized arguments and grant.
Delegation constraint
A server must not convert a client’s broad tool visibility into downstream authority.
03 / Worked denial
Test a request outside the grant.
A valid MCP client calls update_customer with another tenant’s ID.
Adversarial verification
Call update_customer with a token for the wrong MCP resource, then retry with a valid token but wrong tenant. Confirm transport and executor deny different failures.
04 / Review and responsibility
What should the audit trail prove?
Token validation result, request ID, tool/arguments, decision, downstream call and record state.
Gateway-only enforcement fails if alternate routes reach the protected API.
Platform primary source