Bounded authority for security remediation.
Let security automation take a precise action for a defined incident while keeping detection and execution in their existing systems.
Is this remediation within the incident, target and risk boundary?
Problem → control → outcomeRemediation is more than investigation
An agent may investigate broadly but should not inherit unrestricted ability to isolate endpoints, revoke sessions, rotate secrets, disable accounts, quarantine workloads or change cloud configuration. Each operation has different reversibility and operational impact.
ProofGrid’s role is the authority decision around the requested action. Detection remains with SIEM, EDR/XDR, threat intelligence or other security systems. Execution remains with the endpoint, identity, cloud or SOAR system that can perform it.
- Isolate endpoint
- Revoke session
- Rotate secret
- Disable account
- Quarantine workload
- Change cloud configuration
Incident-scoped grants
A grant can name the incident, affected assets, permissible remediation types, duration and escalation thresholds. A security agent responding to one compromised workload should not be able to quarantine a different production cluster merely because it has the same remediation tool available.
Policy can require a human approval for high-blast-radius changes. Changing a cloud security group may be valid for a narrow containment step but unacceptable if it cuts off unrelated services.
Changing trust during an incident
Incident state changes quickly. Evidence may be reclassified, a threat may spread, or an operator may take over. The next remediation decision should reflect current posture and authority. A task cancellation or revoked parent grant should stop pending actions.
Every consequential response should link decision, approval where required, execution response and observed outcome. That record enables review without presenting ProofGrid as the detector or the actuator.
Plan reversibility and blast radius
Rotating a secret, disabling an account and isolating a host have different recovery paths. Before granting autonomous remediation, define the expected effect, rollback mechanism, affected users or services and when an operator must intervene. An agent should not be able to expand from one compromised endpoint to a whole fleet merely because the same tool can address both.
The agent may gather evidence broadly while write actions remain tightly scoped. This separation lets automation accelerate investigation without converting every alert into unrestricted production change authority.
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