01 / Attack path
How the boundary is crossed
An unregistered worker copies a service credential and submits a remediation request as the production incident agent.
- 01Lower-trust input
- 02Attempted instruction
- 03Protected action
- 04Enforced decision
02 / Containment
Where bounded authority limits the effect
Bind the workload credential to attested runtime and registered owner, then require a current task grant for the exact remediation target.
03 / Failure and evidence
The attacker’s opportunity and the defender’s record
A valid but stolen credential is accepted as proof of both identity and permission.
Record workload identity, runtime signal, task grant, target, denial and credential revocation.
04 / Canonical scope
Why this reference stands alone
Rogue execution concerns the unauthorized process lifecycle; impersonation owns the false-principal claim.
Protocol or attack trace
False-principal attack trace
Unregistered worker steals a production service credential and submits a host-isolation call as agent A.
Reject when workload attestation or task grant does not bind credential to the active runtime and target.
Primary references