01 / Attack path
How the boundary is crossed
A guarded Kubernetes tool denies delete, but a shell tool inside the same runtime can call the cluster API directly.
- 01Lower-trust input
- 02Attempted instruction
- 03Protected action
- 04Enforced decision
02 / Containment
Where bounded authority limits the effect
Place enforcement at the cluster API or a non-bypassable boundary, remove alternate credentials and compare protected API logs with policy decisions.
03 / Failure and evidence
The attacker’s opportunity and the defender’s record
The wrapper’s clean audit log is mistaken for proof that no deletion occurred.
Find unpaired cluster operations, credential used, denied wrapper attempt and observed resource state.
04 / Canonical scope
Why this reference stands alone
Executor bypass covers a denied request slipping past execution; this page owns an alternate route.
Protocol or attack trace
Alternate-route probe
Kubernetes wrapper denies deletion; shell tool reaches cluster API with same service credential.
Cluster-side policy or credential separation denies raw delete and flags operation without a decision ID.
Primary references